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1 Introduction 
Despite the fact that the phrase "market socialism" has a respectable history, 
dating back to Lange:s (1938) famous contribution in the Austrian debate, there 
has been little formal économic theorizing on the nature ofmarket socialism. 1 We 
take market socialism to be a system of economic organization in which (1) the 
state has the authority to influence the pattern and levels of investnient across 
sectors; (2a) most, ifnot aH, resources are distributed via markets; (2b) citizens, in 
particular, earn income from labor that is traded on markets; (3a) firms are 
publicly owned, which means that profits are distributed to members of the 
population in proportions that are politically determined; and (3b) firms 
maximize profits. In this chapter, we depart from much contemporary literature 
(e.g., Miller, 1990 and Estrin and LeGrand, 1989, but not Brus and Laski, 1990), 
and do not consider the presence of worker-managed firms to be a necessary 
condition of market socialismo 
Given the above characterization of market socialism, two kinds of question 
naturally arise. The first concerns the cOllsistellcy of the five characteristics listed 
above. For example, can one design institutions which will assure that firms 
maximize profits while at the same time distributing profits diffusely among the 
population rather than concentrating firm ownership in the hands of stock-
holders who can trade stock? Is it possible for the government to control the 
distribution of corporate profits, without interfering with profit-maximization? 
It is largely these questions that have animated the debate on market socialism in 
recent years. The second kind of question concerns the flexibility of market 
socialismo Assuming that the incentive problems raised by the first kind of 
question can be sol ved, to what extent can a market socialist economy differ from 
a capitalist economy? In particular, what scope is there for planning in an 
economy where most private goods are allocated through markets? Ifthe answer 
to the second question were "very little," then there would be little reason to 
advocate a market socialist economy. Social democracy, a system with significant 
redistribution of income but in which investment decisions are still made by 
capitalists, would be no different from market socialism, and probably easier to 
implement. 
Our focus in this chapter is on the second kind of question. Our modeling 
choice has been to treat the structure of investment as the planning objective, 
although we could have chosen other objectives instead, such as the level of 
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employment or the structure of employment across industries. Our treatment of 
the problem is classical: we attempt to characterize the class ofinvestment vectors 
that can be implemented in a market economy if the government has available 
various types of price and quantity instruments. We have chosen investment as 
the focus, for we believe it is arguably the aspect of capitalist economies that most 
justifies intervention. In large economies, at least, investment leads the business 
cycle. Furthermore, there are significant externalities, both positive and negative, 
associated with investment that may justify government intervention.2 We do not 
debate here with those who argue that government intervention in the investment 
process can only lower social welfare from what it would be without intervention. 
Let there be an investment-good industry, sector O, and N sectors which use the 
investment good as an input and produce consumer goods. The economy exists 
for two periods; in the first period, firms place orders for the investment good 
which will increase their productivity in the second periodo In a private-
ownership model ofthe economy, there will be a Walrasian equilibrium in which 
a certain vector of investments ¡w = (rt, ... , ~') is attained in the consumer-
good industries. The socialist state, however, wishes to implement a different 
vector of investments, say r 
How can the center implement the sectoral investment I? We assume that it 
has available various price or quantity instruments and various options for 
taxation; as summarized in Figure 17.1, we characterize the class of implemen-
table investment vectors for three combinations of these instruments, indicated 
by the filled-in cells of Figure 17.1. 
We view Lange's (1938) On the Economic Theory of Socialism ás the direct 
ancestor of our own study. Despite the claimed parentage, Lange's concerns were 
quite different from ours. He facilely remarked that the center could set the 
interest rate to implement the level of total investment that it wants to attain in 
the economy - that was the extent of his concern with the implementation 
problem, as we h¡lVe defined it. In section 4 we present a model which generalizes 
Lange's suggestion. The set ofinstruments consists of N discounts on the market 
interest rate - one for the firm in each consumer-good sector. Taxes are levied on 
firm profits to balance the deficit of the central bank. Firms borrow to finance 
investment; they maximize profits in the presence of markets for all commodities. 
Each citizen receives, as well as wage income, a fraction of total after-tax profits, 
what Lange called the social dividend, which is determined by some political 
process. 
Lange did not study the set of implementable investment vectors, but was 
con cerned with the calculation of prices. He remarked that the prices of consumer 
goods could well be set by markets, but the prices of investment goods were too 
important to be left to the market, and should be set by the center equal to their 
values at market equilibrium. Evidently, he believed that disequilibrium in the 
investment-goods' sectors was too destabilizing for the economy, and that a 
considerable advantage of socialism over capi talism would be the setting of these 
prices by the center instead of the market. Thus, he proposed a tatonnement 
mechanism by which the state could calcula te prices that would converge, he 
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Figure 17.1 The class of implementable ínvestment veclors 
assumed, to equilibrium.3 In the literature that followed Lange (notab!y, Arrow 
and Hurwicz, 1958, and Arrow, Block and Hurwicz, 1959), the queS~IO? of the 
convergence of tatonnement was studied rigorously. But the baslc .Is~ue of 
implementation has never been raised in the literature on market soclahsm. 
Economists have since beco me less interested in tatonnement, beca use of the 
results ofDebreu (1974) and Sonnenschein (1973a, 1973b) demonstrating that on 
the space of economic environments, the convergence of the tatonnement process 
to Walrasian equilibrium is the exception rather than the rule. In our cha~ter, we 
study only the existence of equilibrium. We think of the cent~~ a~ settmg the 
values of its instruments, and then view the existence of an eqUlhbnum at those 
parameter values as a stylization of the conventional wisdom that "the market 
finds equilibrium."4 . . 
There is an important inconsistency between the motlvatlOn o~ our study ~nd 
the models exhibited below. In the models, there is no uncertamty, there IS a 
complete set of futures markets, and there are no externalities. But it is prec.is.ely 
uncertainty, the lack offutures markets and insurance markets, and externahtH:s, 
which motivate influencing the investment vector of an economy away fro~ ItS 
laissez-faire value. Our apology consists in conjecturing that the concluslOns 
about planning that we arrive at here will be preserved in more realistic and 
complex models. . .. 
Incentive issues related to asymmetric informatlOn and the pohtlcs of a market 
socialist society are beyond the scope of the present chapter; for discussion of 
these issues and their relation to the models of this chapter, see Bardhan and 
Roemer (1992). . 
In organizing the chapter, we have followed the practice ofSen (1?71). Sect~ons 
2 through 6 present the analysis informally and verbally; th~ ~stensked sectlOns 
with the same numbers which follow present the formal defillltlOns and theorems. 
Proofs are available separately (Ortuño-Ortin, Roemer and Silvestre, 1991). 
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2 The economic environment 
There are N + 1 sectors in the economy and two time periods. There is one firm 
in each sector. Firm O produces the only investment good in the economy, and 
opera tes only in the first periodo Firm j (j = 1, ... , N) produces a consumption 
good in each periodo In the first period, each of the N + 1 firms has a production 
function with only labor as an input. We view the capital stock as already fixed, 
and unchangeable in the first periodo During the second period, the production 
for each consumer-good firm is a function of investment and labor. These firms 
place orders for the investment good in period one, and make their investments in 
period two. 
There are M citizens, each with a utility function defined over the N 
consumption goods in each period: there are 2N arguments in each utility 
function. In particular, We assume for simplicity that labor (or leisure) is not an 
argument in the utilíty function: each citizen offers the entire endowment of his 
labor in each period, so long as the wage is positive. There is only one kind of 
labor in the model; thus, differential skill is only imperfectly modeled as 
differentiallabor endowment. Each citizen has an entitlement to a share of profits 
of each firm, his "social dividend." In principie, there can be M(N + 1) such 
shares. In a socialist economy, the government may opt to set simply a share of 
total profits going to each citizen, and so there would be only M such shares 
delíneated: we call this the simple socialist case. The setting of shares, in any case, 
is the outcome of a polítical process. (Lange suggested that a household 's social 
dividend be proportional to its size. We shall comment on this below.) In the 
general case, which includes that of a capitalist- economy with government 
intervention (a social democracy), the shares of profits going to citizens vary 
across firms as well. 
The timing of economic activity is as follows. Wages are paid at the end of each 
production period, and commodities are sold at the end of the period in which 
they are produced. Profits are paid to citizens at the end of the period in which 
they arise. Consumer-good firms order the investment good during the first 
period, but investment is not accounted as a cost of production until the second 
period, for it enters into production only then. Since firms must distribute (or 
turn over to the state) profits at the end of the first period, they must borrow to 
finance investment, because the investment good must be purchased at the end of 
the first periodo Citizens, on the other hand, consume in each period, and al so 
save in the first period; an equilibrium condition in the economy will be that total 
savings of citizens equals total investment of firms. At the end of the second 
period, firms pay back principal and interest, and citizens count the matured 
loans with interest as income in the second periodo 
Total labor in the first period must be allocated between the production of the 
investment good and consumer goods. The larger the fraction of its labor an 
economy allocates to investment, the smaller its consumption will be in the first 
period, and the larger it will be in the second period, since investment augments 
the production of output in the second periodo A government which seeks to raise 
Investment planning in market socialism 283 
levels of investment, in this model, is thus concerned to replace first-period 
consumption with second-period consumption. 
3 Constrained Walrasian equilibrium: a command-market-thought 
experiment 
Suppose the government, which wishes to implement a given vector of 
investments across sectors, were able costlessly to monitor firms. A natural way 
of accomplishing its goal would be as follows: to command each consumer-good 
firm to invest exactly the desired amount, and to allow markets to do the rest. We 
call the market equilibrium associated with this procedure an exactly-constrained 
Walrasian (ECW) equilibrium. It is, formally speaking, a set of prices and an 
allocation which constitute a Walrasian equilibrium, with one restriction: that 
each consumer-good firm has no choice but to invest in the way commanded. In 
particular, it might well be at such an equilibrium that sorne firms register 
negative profits, for they are being commanded to invest more than they would if 
they were unrestricted. Thus, firms do not have the option of shutting down, for 
shutting down entails investing a zero amount. When profits are negative for a 
firm at an ECW equilibrium, the los ses must be paid for by citizens, according to 
their assigned shares of firm profits. In this case, the entitlement to a firm 's profits 
becomes an obligation to cover the firm's losses. 
To be slightly more precise, an exactly-constrained Walrasian (ECW) equilib-
rium relative to a vector of sectoral investments I = (11", • ,IN) is a set of prices, an 
interest rate and an allocation such that: 
(l) Each consumer-good firmj demands labor and supplies output to maximize 
the present value of profits over two periods at giv~n prices, subject to its 
demanding the investment good exactly in amount I j ; the investment-good 
firm simply demands labor and supplies the investment good to maximize 
profits at given prices (in particular, it receives no command from the 
government). 
(2) Each citizen receives labor income and his share of (constrained) profits of 
each firm, and chooses consumption and savings to maximize his utility over 
both periods subject to his budget constraints (one for each period). 
(3) AII markets clear. (In particular, the supply ofthe investment good by firm O 
equals the total investment demanded by the consumer-good firms, and total 
citizens' savings equals the total cost of the investment good.) 
If the government chooses to implement an investment vector which is very 
large compared to the unconstrained Walrasian investment allocation for the 
economy, there may well exist no ECW equilibrium relative to that investment 
vector. The reason: investment might be so high that, at any candidate vector of 
prices, the total profits of consumer-good firms are negative, and indeed so 
negative that sorne citizens face a negative net income (their wage income does 
not suffice to pay their share of corporate losses). Thus, there will exist sorne set of 
investment vectors that can be implemented as ECW equilibria for a given 
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economic environment, and in general this set will be strictly smaller than the set 
of feasible investment vectors for the economic environment. A feasible 
investment vector is one which the economy is technologically capable of 
realizing. Indeed, we view the maximal feasible totallevel of investment as the 
amount of investment good that can be produced with tlie economy's entire 
supply oflabor in the first periodo (This assumes that citizens can survive with no 
consumption in the first period; otherwise, we must alter the maximum feasible 
amount of investment appropriately.) The maximal feasible level of investment 
can be divided among consumer-good firms arbitrarily (again, assuming there 
are no restrictions on the pattern of feasible consumption in the second period). 
A second thought experiment relaxes the requirement that the firm invest 
exactly the amount commanded by the government, and replaces it with the 
requirement that the firm invest at least the amount commanded. Thus, each firm 
may elect to invest autonomously abo ve the commanded amount, if that would 
increase profits at the given prices. We analogously define a constrained 
Walrasian (CW) equilibrium relative to T as a set of prices and an allocation which 
satisfy (1 )-(3) aboye, but with the relaxed restriction. There will be a set of 
investment vectors that can be implemented as constrained Walrasian equilibria. 
We are here interested in the aggregate level of investment in each sector 
(commanded plus autonomous investment). Note that every constrained 
Walrasian allocation is also an exactly-constrained Walrasian allocation. For if 
an aggregate investment vector T arises as a CW equilibrium, it also can be viewed 
as an ECW equilibrium, at the same prices, where the government commands 
firms to invest exactly at the levels of T. The set of constrained Walrasian 
allocations is thus a proper sub-set of the set of exactly-constrained Walrasian 
allocations. The exactly-constrained Walrasian concept is interesting only if the 
government wants to Iimit investment in sorne firms to levels that are lower than 
their Walrasian levels, roughly speaking: for if it is concerned only to increase 
investment levels, it might as well set lower bounds only on the amount a firm 
must invest. 
Although the set of investment vectors that can be implemented as constrained 
(or exactly-constrained) Walrasian equilibria is not as large as the set that could 
be implemented by a Stalinist system in which labor is directly allocated to the 
investment good industry, we take it to be a natural set of investment vectors to 
aim at implementing with market socialist techniques: for it relies upon the 
market to decentralize all resource allocation - not only the allocation and 
pattern of final consumption, but the allocation of labor to firms. In particular, as 
a consequence of the use of markets we have: any constrained (resp. exactly-
constrained) Walrasian equilibrium relative to lis Pareto-efficient among the set 
offeasible allocations in which sectoral investments are greater than or equal to 
(resp. precisely equal to) P 
The command mechanism used here, however, is highly unrealistic, as in 
reality firms cannot be costlessly monitored, and it is hard to imagine that 
management of firms could be easily motivated to engage in production plans 
which entaillosses. In particular, we shall assume throughout our discussion that 
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incentives have been created that induce managers to maximize profits - such 
incentives would work counter to the implementation of CW (or ECW) 
allocations, and so sorne other mechanism must be used if we are to implement 
the CW allocations realistically. 
In the next two sections, we propose alternative mechanisms which indeed can 
implement the set of allocations (and investment vectors) that can be theoreti-
cally reached as CW and ECW equilibria, but in ways that firms achieve the 
desired result by maxirnizing profits subject to no commands from the center. 
4 A generalization of Lange's idea 
Once it has a viable market, the state should have reliable leverage to inftuence economic 
processes. This ineludes, in the first place, a rational profit tax system for enterprises and 
an income tax system:for the general population, financial controls, the state bank's 
regulation of money turnover as a single whole, and an active credit policy, ineluding 
lending rates corresponding to actual economic conditions. (Mikhail S. Gorbachev6 ) 
Lange wrote that the state bank should generate the desired investment level in 
the economy by setting the interest rate at which firms can borrow. Since our 
planner desires to implement a vector ofinvestment levels, her instrument will be 
a vector of N discounts (or surcharges) on the market interest rate: one at which 
each consumer-good firm can borrow to finance investment. 
Suppose that the planner wishes to increase all investments of consumer-good 
firms aboye their unconstrained Walrasian levels. Let the Walrasian interest rate 
be r. Assuming that all other prices remain fixed at their Walrasian levels, the 
planner can increase the investments chosen by firms by posting interest rate 
discounts for them. This will increase the demand for investment. To genera te the 
required savings from citizens to finance the increased demand for investme~t 
funds, the market interest rate must rise aboye r. But then the central bank wIll 
suffer a deficit at the end of the second period, for it collects interest at low rates 
from firms at that time, and must pay out interest at the higher market rate to 
citizens. The deficit must be covered by taxing citizens' incomes. We allow the 
planner to tax only corporation profits to cover the deficit. 
With this motivation, we define a Lange equilibrium with corporate taxation 
relative to a given vector ofsectoral investments T as a vector ofprices and wages, a 
vector of N interest rate discounts, and a vector of tax rates 7 on the profits of the 
N consumer-good firms such that the following hold: 
(1) Each consumer-good firm maximizes the present value of profits. It discounts 
its second-period profits by the interest rate appropriate for citizens (the 
"market rate"), since profit income is distributed to them; but it debits the 
cost of investment at the corporate interest rate it is charged. The 
investment-good firm simply maximizes period-one profits. All profits are 
sent to the center. 
(2) The vector of investment levels (autonomously) chosen by firms is T. 
(3) The center disburses profits to citizens, according to their entitlements, after 
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levying taxation at the stated rates for each sector. If a citizen's net after-tax 
social dividend is negative, then he receives a tax bill from the government, 
instead of a positive dividendo 
(4) All consumers choose consumption in each period and savings in the first 
period to maximize utility over both periods, subject to their budget 
constraints, which inelude wage income, social dividends, and interest from 
savings. 
(5) All markets elear. 
Figure 17.2 presents the pattern of money flows in the economy. 
In a Lange equilibrium, the subsidy to firm j is the cost of its expenditure on 
investment times the interest discount that the firm enjoys: for this is precisely the 
deficit that the central bank sustains from financing the firm's investment 
expenditure with high-interest loans from citizens. Note that the tax levied on a 
firm's profits under this scheme may be greater than its profits. In this case, of 
course, the (negative) after-tax profits are charged to citizens according to their 
shares. Or, if the planner wishes to discourage investment by a particular firm, 
that firm will face an interest rate surcharge. 
We define a Lange equilibrium as pro-ínvestment if all firms receive 
(nonnegative) interest rate discounts (not surcharges). Our first theorem states: 
(A) in the simple socialist case, the set of CW allocations is exactly the set of 
pro-investment Lange equilibria; and (B) in the simple socialist case, the set of 
ECW allocations is exactly the set of Lange equilibria. Thus, in the simple 
socialist case the Lange model provides a decentralized, 1l0n-commalld mechanism 
by which evel'ything can be ímplemented that can be implemented using (he 
command stl'ucture of the previous section. 8 In particular, all firm managers are 
instructed, in the Lange model, to maximize profits facing prices and effective 
interest rates.9 
In the general case (i.e., when the profit shares differ across firms as well as 
across citizens), the Lange model is more powerful than the exactly-constrained 
Walrasian model: the set of allocations that can be implemented with the former 
strictly includes the set that can be implemented with the latter. 
We envisage the mechanism working as follows. The center announces the N 
interest rate discounts from the market rate for the firms in the various sectors, 
and the after-tax net dividends to consumers; all prices adjust until markets elear. 
Unlike Lange, we provide no tatonnement story for convergence to equilibrium. 
Our view that the market "finds" the Lange equilibrium is as justified as the 
standard view that the unregulated market finds the Walrasian equilibrium. 
It is worthwhile to examine the special case of Lange equilibrium in which the 
corporate profits' tax rates are constrained to be les s than one. This, in particular, 
will guarantee that citizens always receive nonnegative social dividends. We call 
such an equilibrium a limited-taxation Lange equilibrium relative to T to 
distinguish it fron1 the general case when corporate tax rates can be greater than 
one. In the simple socialist case we have (Theorem 4.2): the set of allocations (and 
investment vectors) that can be implemented as Iimited-taxation Lange equilib-











Figure 17.2 Money flows in the Lange model 
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ria is precisely the set of exactly-constrained Walrasian allocations in which total 
consumer-good firms' profits are nonnegative; and the set of allocations that can 
be implemented as limited-taxation pro-investment Lange equilibria is precisely 
the set ofconstrained Walrasian allocations in which total consumer-good firms' 
profits are nonnegative. 
In any market socialist model, there will be opportunities for arbitrage, or 
black markets, for the government is interfering with the market mechanism. In 
the Lange model, the black market would be a capital market among 
consumer-good firms: firms that can borrow at a low interest rate could profit by 
lending to firms that can borrow only at a higher rateo This must be monitored by 
the center. There may also be opportunities for arbitrage between citizens who 
want to borrow (rather than save) but can do so only at the market rate, and firms 
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that can borrow (and therefore lend) at low rates. In particular, firms might be 
tempted to lend to their workers under mutually advantageous arrangements. 
We initially suggested that the shares oftotal profits distributed to households 
be viewed as a supplement to wage income. We have now seen, however, that if 
the government wishes to implement an investment vector at which total profits 
of firms are less than the total subsidy, then the aforementioned shares become 
citizens' obligations to finance corporate subsidies from their wage income. In 
particular, a vector oflarge sectoral investments may be implementable only by 
assigning large shares of corporate profits (i.e., shares of after-tax corporate debt) 
to citizens with large labor endowments. More generally, the point is that a 
political party's proposal for a schedule of shares may not be independent of the 
investment plan it proposes to implement. 
5 Direct provision of investment by the state 
We next take what seems to be a more direct approach to implementing the 
center's investment targets. In the Lange model, the center acts only by 
interfering with the market interest rate. In the model to be described now, it acts 
as a large economic agent, purchasing the investment good on the market and 
distributing it, gratis, to consumer-good firms. It finances the purchase of the 
investment good by levying taxes on corporate profits. Firms are free to purchase 
more of the investment good if they must to maximize profits; they know the 
amount ofinvestment they will receive from the state. This scheme is reminiscent 
of Brus' (1972, Ch. 5) proposal of Ha planned economy with a built-in market 
mechanism." 
To be precise, a direct investment equilibrium relative to lis a set of prices, 
wages, an interest rate, a set oC corporate tax rates, and an allocation at which: 
(1) Every firm maximizes profits, choosing labor demands, outputs, and 
autonomous investment levels, knowing that it will receive the prescribed 
amount of investment, ~, from the state. 
(2) All profits are distributed, net of corporation taxes, to citizens. Each citizen 
maximizes utility over two periods, subject to his budget constraints. 
(3) Total taxes collected exactly finance the investment good purchased by the 
state. 
(4) All markets clear. 
We again specialize the direct investment concept to limited-taxation direct 
investment equilibrium, in which we restrict corporate tax rates to be between zero 
and one. 
The first theorem is quite analogous to our result in section 4: in the simple 
socialist case, the set of direct-investment allocations is equal to the set of 
constrained Walrasian allocations, and the set of limited-taxation direct 
investment allocations is equal to the set ofconstrained Walrasian allocations in 
which total profits of consumer-good firms are nonnegative. 
We conclude our analysis of the Lange and direct investment models by 
I nvestment planning in market socialism 289 
comparing the set of allocations that can be implemented with each of them. 
Theorem 5.2 states that: (A) in general, the set of allocations that can be 
implemented as limited-taxation pro-investment Lange equilibria is a proper 
sub-set of the set of limited-taxation direct investment equilibria. Thus, the direct 
investment mechanism is in principie more powerful than the Lange mechanism, 
as long as the center wants to encourage (rather than discourage) investment. 10 
(If it wants to discourage sorne investment levels, then it will set an interest rate 
surcharge for sorne firms; the direct investment model is useless if discourage-
ment is desired.) (B) However, the increased power of the direct investment 
mechanism vis-a-vis the Lange mechanism vanishes in the simple socialist case, for 
in that case we have that the sets of limited-taxation Lange allocations and 
limited-taxation direct investment allocations are identical. 
We do not conclude that, in practice, these two implementation mechanisms-
Lange and direct investment - would be equivalent in the simple socialist case. 
For they may well differ in certain aspects that we have ignored at the level of 
abstraction of our analysis. For instance, we have assumed that the center has 
available all the data describing the economic environment, and hence can 
calculate exactly the values of the instruments, such as interest rates, required to 
implement the desired investment vector. In reality, the center has only 
econometric and survey data. Suppose it announces the "wrong" vector of 
interest rate discounts, in the Lange model. It watches the markets, and adjusts 
the discounts as it sees what actually happens. This is relatively easy, and we can 
imagine that the economy will end up at sorne Lange equilibrium reasonably 
close to the one the center was aiming at, assuming its original information on 
demand Cunctions and technologies was reasonably good. But in the direct 
investment model, the center commits itself to make certain purchases of the 
investment good, and to certain deliveries to firms. It may be much harder to 
adjust these obligations. 
We may summarize the practical conclusion oC sections 3, 4, and 5 as follows: 
in the simple socialist case, any allocation that can be implemented by the 
interventionist techniques ofthe command-market or direct irivestment mechan-
isms Can also be implemented by the informationally superior, less intervention-
ist Lange mechanism. 
6 The sales-tax model 
As in the Lange model, the government objective is to implement exactly a given 
strictly positive vector I = (11 , ••• , IN) of sector al investment. Aga~n as in the 
Lange model, the firms follow price signals. But now the government mstruments 
are taxes on sales, i.e., the prices faced by the firm differ from those Caced by 
consumers. Because the present instrument requires the government to collect 
taxes (Crom citizens) instead of giving subsidies (to firms), running the sch~me 
now genera tes a surplus instead of a deficit. Balancing the budge~ now reqUlres 
the transCer oC Cunds to the citizens, instead oC from them. Balancmg the budget 
does not thereCore conflict with the need to keep the wealth oC citizens positive. 
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The previous existence difficulties associated with this conflict thus do not appear 
here. Actually, existence of equilibrium can now be proved given an arbitrary rule 
for transferring the government surplus to citizens. 
Another difference from the Lange model is that now all firms face the same 
input prices. This implies productive efficiency: contrary to the Lange and direct 
investment models, in a sales-tax equilibrium it is not possible to increase the 
output of all consumer goods by a mere reallocation of inputs. 
We view the government as choosing 2N ad valorem tax rates, one for each 
conSUmer good in each periodo This introduces a discrepancy between the price 
received by the producer and the price paid by the consumer (the latter being 
equal to the former multiplied by one plus the tax rate). Thus, the description of 
an equilibrium may specify the 2N producer prices and either the 2N tax rates or, 
equivalently, the 2N prices faced by consumers. We choose the second 
convention. The complete description of a sales-tax equilibrium relative to the 
vector of sectoral investments r and to a given rule of (lump-sum) transfer of the 
government surplus is given by (a) wage rates for the first and second periods, (b) a 
price for the investment good, interpreted as both the price received by the firm 
that produces it and the price paid by the firms that use it as an input, (c) first- and 
second-period producer prices for the N goods sold to consumers, (d) first- and 
second-period consumer prices for the same goods, and (e) an allocation such 
that: 
(1) the profit-maximizing supply of the investment good (given the investment-
good price and the wage) equals the sum of the components of r 
(2) the profit-maximizing demand for the investment good by each consumer-
good firm (given the wage rates, the price of the investment good and the 
two-period prices of the consumer good faced by the firm) equals the relevant 
component of the vector r 
(3) the wealth of each citizen, which she takes as given, equals the value of her 
labor endowments, plus her profit income (evaluated at the prices faced by 
firms), plus her share in the government surplus as determined by the given 
transfer rule 
(4) the two-period consumption of each citizen maximizes her utility subject to 
the constraint that the value of her two-period consumption, evaluated at 
consumer prices, does not exceed her wealth. 
We adopt the following strategy for tackling the existence issue (Theorem 6.1). 
Set the first-period wage equal to one (Le., first-period labor is used as 
numéraire), and set the price of the investment good at the level that induces its 
producer to supply exactly the required amount (namely, the SUm of the 
components in the vector f). The choice of first-period supplies of consumer 
goods is basically unrestricted: any positive amounts that use up the labor 
resource left after producing the investment good will do. After choosing these 
supplies, set the first-period producer prices at the level that induces the supply of 
precisely these quantities. Now we impose an assumption guaranteeing that the 
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marginal rate of input substitution goes to zero with the am~unt of lab~r input 
used: a fixed-point argument guarantees that, under thls. assumptlOn,. an 
allocation of the second-period labor resource exists that.equ~hzes the marglOal 
rates of input substitution across firms when each firm IS uslo~ the amou?t of 
investment good in r. Because the price of the investment good IS already glv~n, 
this common marginal rate yields the appropriate second-period w~ge: By settlOg 
output prices equal to marginal costs we complete t~e descnptlo? ?f the 
quantities supplied and producer prices. We are left wlth the descnptlOn of 
consumer prices and quantities. 
To this end choose an arbitrary number (/. not lower than the value of the 
two-period ou~put of consumer goods evaluated ~t the just specified. producer 
prices. A second fixed-point argument shows the eXIstence of a two-penod vector 
of consumer prices th~t (a) clears the markets and (?) puts the aggregate value of 
the two-period output of consumer goods at precIsely (/. dollars. 
Intuitively, the center now has 2N instruments, n~mely, the tax r~tes .on each 
consumption good in periods one and two, whereas It has only N obJectlves, the 
investment levels in N sectors. This leaves N degrees offreedo~. The center may, 
in particular, induce any allocation among the N sectors ~slOg the .amount of 
first-period labor left after producing the prescribed quantlt~ of the IOve~tment 
good, using up N - 1 degrees offreedom. Moreover, it can, wlthout aff~ctlng t~e 
amounts of each good produced, arbitrarily choose it~ total tax r~~el~ts. Thls 
suggests that a rich variety of allocations ca~ be obtalOe~ as eq.Ulhbna of the 
sales-tax model, for a given investment vector l. There may, m pa~tlcula~, b~ large 
government surpluses which empower the given transfer r~le wlth a s~gm~cant 
distributional role. The sales-tax mechanism becomes partlcu~arl~ flexible If the 
transfer rule is not a priori given but can be chosen as a pohcy lOstrument. 
Finally, we address the comparison of the direc~ inv~stment and the. ~al~s-tax 
schemes. The comparison is not obvious beca use dlrect lOv.estment equlhbr~a are 
second-best efficient under the sectoral investment constralOts, but they typlcally 
display productive inefficiency (shifting ?~t~ ca~ital and lab~r amo~g sectors 
could increase production). Sales-tax eqUlhbna display productlve efficlency and 
they distribute the produced amounts efficiently, b~t they ~r~ not second-best 
efficient relative to the sectoral investment constralOts (shl~tlO.g labor among 
sectors could yield a different output mix that could be dlstnbuted so as to 
Páreto-dominate the original allocation). But it turns. out that the. sales-tax 
mechanism is superior to the direct investment one m the followlOg sense 
(Theorem 6.2): given a direct investment equilibrium, one can find a t~ansfer rule 
with a sales-tax equilibrium that yields th.: same aggregate level of I~vestment 
(Le., the same sum of the components in l) yet (weakly) Pareto-domlOates the 
original direct investment equilibrium. . 
A sales-tax scheme may present serious polítical problems, especIally when.the 
mechanism involves large discrepancies between producer and consumer pnces 
(Le., large government surpluses). We conclude with a quotation from Lange 
(1938 :96-97) on these difficulties: 
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There would be two sets of prices of consumers' goods. One would be the market prices at 
which the goods are sold to the consumers; the other, the accounting prices derived from 
the preference scale fixed by the Central Planning Board. The latter set of prices would be 
those on the basis of which the managers of production would make their decisions. 
However, it does not seem very probable that such a system would be tolerated by the 
citizens of a socialist community. The dual system of prices of consumers' goods would 
reveal to the people that the bureaucrats in the Central Planning Board allocate the 
community's productive resources according to a preference scale different from that of 
the citizens. 
We concur with this view, and believe that the direct investment or Lange 
mechanism may be politically more acceptable, at least domestically, in 
particular when financed by a corporation tax. It must be mentioned, however, 
that the use of interest rate or direct investment subsidies to firms producing 
internationally traded goods will draw accusations of unfair practices from 
governments of rival producers. 
7 Conclusion 
We have offered sorne preliminary, iflengthy, ex pi oration s on methods by which 
the center may implement a given target of sectoral investments in an economy 
where (a) firms maximize profits, (b) goods and labor are allocated through 
markets, and (c) profit shares are exogenously given. Two types of society are 
covered: first, a social democratic one, where firms are privately owned, profit 
shares simply reftect private property rights, and the state has an activist 
investment policy; second, a market socialist economy, where firms are publicly 
owned, managers are instructed to maximize profits, and profit shares are 
parameters, generated by a democratic process, for the distribution of the social 
surplus. We define the simple socialist case to be a socialist economy where profit 
shares do not vary across firms. 
Qur object is to study the range of investment vectors or allocations that can be 
achieved through the following instruments: (i) central commands to firms, (ii) 
interest rates faced by firms, as suggested by Lange; (iii) direct investment by the 
center; and (iv) sales-tax rates. The center must always balance its budget. We 
endow the center with the capability to tax profits as it sees fit for the amount 
needed to cover the cost of its investment programo 
We consider command mechanisms, which share the feature of leaving to the 
market the allocation of labor and consumer goods while the center issues 
commands on investment. In the first one, called the constrained Walrasian 
mechanism, the center imposes a lower bound on the investment of each industry, 
but firms are free to invest more ifthey so wish. Thus, the mechanism is unable to 
force low levels of investment. In the second mechanism, called exactly-
constrained Walrasian, the center commands exactly the investment level of the 
firm, and, hence, it can force both high and low investment levels. The Lange 
mechanism can in principIe set interest rates for firms that are lower or higher 
than the market rate, and, as an effect, it may induce both high and low 
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investment levels. We define the pro-investment Lange mechanism by requiring 
that the interest rates faced by firms do not exceed the market rateo 
A first result is that, in the general case, the Lange mechanism is more powerful 
than the exactly-constrained Walrasian mechanism. (In a parallel manner,. the 
pro-investment Lange mechanism is more powerful than t~e con~tramed 
Walrasian mechanism.) Thus, the indirect instruments of credlt subsldy and 
profit taxation give the center more ftexibility than direc~ commands ~n 
investment. The intuition is that the command method affects mcomes only vla 
investment whereas the Lange mechanism has two tools: credit conditions, 
which affe~t both investment levels and incomes, and taxes, which are an 
independent instrument for income redistribution. This extr~ ft~xibil~ty is, 
however lost in the simple socialist case, where the Lange mechamsm IS equlValent 
to the e;actly-constrained one. This is so because, in the simple socialist case, 
varying tax rates across firms has no effect on the tax bill of a consumero 
Qne should moreover note that these results are based on a strong form of 
taxation because the center is able to tax profits at arate exceeding 100 percent, 
in effect ~lso taxing wage income. Ifthis strong form oftaxation is ruled out, and if 
attention is restricted to the simple socialist case, then the Lange mechanism can 
achieve the same allocations that the exactly-constrained Walrasian mechanism can 
achieve with nonnegative aggregate projits (and, in a parallel manner, the 
pro-investment Lange mechanism can achieve the same allocations that the 
constrained Walrasian can with nonnegative profits). 
Next we consider the direct investment mechanism. The center now distri-
bu tes the investment good free of charge to firms, and does not restrict the 
autonomous investment of firms: it can induce high, but not low, investment 
levels. In particular, it may be unable to implement sorne low-investme~t stat~s 
that could be reached either by exact constraints or by the Lange mechamsm (vla 
high effective interest rates). What about its power to encourage, rather than 
discourage, investment? The relevant comparison is between the pr~-investm~nt 
Lange mechanism and the direct investment mechanism, but wlth taxatlon 
limited to rates not exceeding 100 percent. This comparison gives sharp results: 
the two mechanisms are equivalent in the simple socialist case, while in the general 
case the direct investment mechanism is, in principie, more powerful. 
Lastly, we consider the sales-tax mechanism, where the cente~ may impose a 
divergence between the prices paid by consumers and those rec~lved by firm~. It 
turns out that the sales-tax mechanism can implement a large vanety of allocatlOns 
and investment vectors, but it may require large price differences that are 
politically problematic. Thus, this scheme cannot easily be compared with the 
others. 
While the direct investment mechanism often emerges here as not inferior to 
the Lange one, and sometimes superior to it, our abstractions may con~eal sorne 
reasons favoring the interest rate-guided Lange approach. Two speclfic ex ten-
sions of the analysis deserve study. First, the path-breaking work by Weitzman 
(1974) suggests that the superiority ofprice or quantity instruments ~nder limited 
information may well depend on the curvature of the relevant functlOns. Second, 
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if there are many firms in each industry, then sectoral investment targets may 
perhaps be implemented more simply via interest rates than by individual 
quantity signals. We conclude with an invitation to further research. 
2* The economic environment 
There are N + 1 firms and two periods. Firm O produces an investment good in 
the first periodo Firm j, for j = 1, ... , N, produces a consumption good in each 
periodo In the first period, the production function of firm j is 1/ (L), for 
j = O, ... , N, where L is labor; in the second period, the production functions are 
1/(1, L),j = 1, ... ,N wherel is theinvestment good. Forj = O, ... , N, weassume 
that the function 1/ is concave, strictly increasing, and differentiable on R+ +' 
and satisfies 1/ (O) = O. For j= 1 ... , N, we assume that 1/ is concave, strictly 
increasing, and differentiable on R~ + , and satisfies 1/ (O, O) = O. 
There are M consumers. The utility function of consumer i is 
U (X I 1 2 2 ) h l' th . f d . . . / 1"" ,XN,X I ,··· ,xN w ere x j IS e consumptton o goo ] m penod t; the 
endowment of consumer i is a vector of labor inputs in the two periods, (L: , L¡ ) 
and a vector (O¡O' ... , O/N) where Oij is í's share of firm j's profits. If our model is 
describing a social democracy, 11 then Oi) has the usual interpretation as an 
ownership share. If we are describing a socialist economy, then we interpret the 
profits that i receives as a social dividend, to use Lange's phrase, in which case the 
vectors {O¡/ i = 1, ... , M} are chosen by the center. (According to Lange, Oij 
should be chosen to reflect need, perhaps in proportion to family size.) Note that 
consumers derive no utility from leisure; thus, consumer i always supplies his 
entire labor endowment. 
We denote a leasible allocation as a tuple (X I ,x2,yl,y2,LID,L2D,I) where 
x'eR~M for t = 1,2, yl = (y~,y:, ... ,y~)eR~+I, y2 = (Yi, ... ,y~)eR~, 
LID = (L~D, ... ,L~D)eR~+ 1, L 2D = (LiD, ... ,L~D)eR~, 1= (11'"'' IN)eR~, 
satisfying 
M 
LX:j;;¡;y~, j=1, ... ,N;t=I,2, 
i= 1 
N 
L lj;;¡; y~, 
J=I 
,iJI(L]D)=y], j=O, ... ,N, 
,iJ2(lj,L;D) = y;, j= I, ... ,N, 
N M 
L L]D;;¡; L Li, and 
j=O /= 1 
N M 
'" e D < '" L-~ L J = L l· 
j= 1 i= 1 
Thus, x: j is the consumption of good j by consumer i in period t; y'. is the 
production of firm j in period t ; L~D is the demand for labor by firm j in ~eriod t, 
etc. We will often denote vectors by deletion of a subscript: thus 
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O - (O O'N) L I = (L II , ... , LMI ), X¡I = (x l\,· •• , XtN)' etc. Similarly, prices I - 10' ••• , I , I I I I N + I 2 -
are denoted (pl,p2,W I ,W2) where p = (po'PI,,,,,PN)eR+ , p.-
(p2 p2)eRN are goods' prices and w'eR+, t = 1,2, are wages. We wnte 1'"'' N +, 
I 1 1) d _( 1 2) P-o = (PI"",PN' an P-o- P-o,P . . . 
We will almost always take the Arrow-Debreu viewpomt and treat aH tra~mg 
decisions as made at the beginning of period 1, facing a vector of f~tures pnc~s 
(pi, p2, wl, w2). Thus each consumer has one budget constramt .over hls 
"lifetime" and each firm maximizes the sum of profits over the two penods. The 
amounts that consumers save and firms borrow are therefore not explicitly 
shown, and the interest rate is hidden in the price vector. 
3* Constrained Walrasian equilibrium: a command-market-tbought 
experiment ; 
Let 1= (11"" ,IN) be a given investment vector. Imagine the ce~ter comma~ds 
firm j to invest precisely ~ (j = 1, ... , N); at an exactly-constrame~ ~alr~s!an 
(ECW) equílibrium relative to J, aH markets clear, a1l consumers m~xlmlze utlltty, 
and aH firms maximize profits subject to their investment constramts. Formally: 
Definition 3.1 2 . -1 -2 -1 -2 -ID -2D -
The price vector (pi, p2 , wl , W ) and the ~~ocatlOn (X , X ,y , Y ,L ,L ,1) 
constitute an ECW equilibrium relative to 1 If: 
(1) (Yo, LID), solves firm O's profit-maximization program: 
maxp¿y¿ - wIL¿D 
S.t. Jol (L¿D) ~ Y¿; 
(y-! y-~ [!D pD) solves firms j's constrained profit-maximization pro-J' J' J ' J 
gram: 
1 1 ID) -ILID -2{'2(l- L2D) -2L2D p-IT' maxPi,iJ (L j -W j +PjJj j' j -W J - o j' 
(2) ex:, x; ) solves consumer i 's utility-maximization program: 
max U¡ (x: ' x~ ) 
N 




-1 '" - - 1 -ID d f . 1 N no = Po L... 1 J - W Lo an , or J = , ... , , 
j= 1 
2 
'" (-r -r -reD) -1 T . nj = L... PjYi - W j - Po J' 
r= 1 
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In particular, consumers' wealths must be nonnegative at an ECW equilib-
rium, a substantive requirement, since it is possible that total profits are negative 
for sorne price vectors. 
That an ECW equilibrium is Pareto-optimal subject to the constraint that the 
investment vector be precisely (11" •• , IN) follows from the usual proof of the 
"first welfare theorem." 
Next, we define a constrained Walrasian (CW) equilibrium relative to I as a 
Walrasian equilibrium in which firmj (j = 1, ... , N) is required to invest at least 
Ij' FormaUy: 
Definition 3.2 
A e W equilibrium relative to lis a price vector (¡'I, ¡,2, wl , w2 ) and allocation 
(X I ,x2,yl,y2,LlD,L2D,R) such that 
(1) Firm O maximizes profits at (y~, L~D); for j = 1, ... ,N, (LJD,L;D,Rj) sol ves 
firm j's profit-maximization program: 
max p; f/ (L;D) - wl L;D + pIf/(RJ, LID) - w2 L;V - p~RJ 
S.t. RJ~~; 
(2) AU consumers maximize utility; 
(3) All markets clear. 
As aboye, the virtue of CW equilibria is that they are second-best Pareto-
optimal, i.e., Pareto-optimal subject to the constraint that the vector of 
investments R is greater than or equal to l. 
4* A generalization of Lange's idea 
Our planner desires to implement a vector lof investment levels; her instrument 
will be a vector (di" .. , dN ) E R~, where d) is the interest rate discount that firm j 
receives from the market rate; the financing scheme will be a vector 
(r l' ... , r N) E R~ of corporate tax rates. Recall from section 2 that firms must 
borrow to finance investment. 
We write down the definition ofLange equilibrium using futures prices, where 
the interest rate discounts are not immediately evident: 
Definition 4.1 
A Lange equilibrium relative to T = (TI" .. , TN ) is a vector oC prices (¡,I, 
¡,2, wl , w2 ), a vector A = (Al" .. , AN ) in R~ , a vector oC corporation profits' tax 
rates (rl, ... ,rN)ER~ and an aUocation (XI,X2,-yt'-l,LlD,PD,f) such that: 12 
maxu¡(xl,x¡) 
N 
t -1 1 -2 2 - IL- I - 2 -2 O - ~ 
s .. P-o'x¡ + P ·x¡ .;:; W ¡ + W L¡ + jQ 1to + L.- (l - 'tJ)OuftJ 
j= 1 
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where ji. is the value of firm j's profits, given in F2a and F2b below: 
J 
F2a (L~D,y~) solves: 
-1 -ILID maxpoYo - W o 
S.t. fo(L~D)~y~; 
F2b For j = 1, ... , N, (L]D, y], L;D,y;,~) solves: 
11 -ILID _22 -2L2D ;'p-II 
max PJ Yj - W j + Pj YJ - W j - j o j 
1 ID) 1 S.t. Jj (LJ ~ YJ' 
2( L2D) 2. Jj IJ, j ~ YJ ' 
N N; 
F3 L 't/tJ = L (1 - ;'j)p~Tj; 
j= 1 j= 1 
N 




Yj = L.- X¡j' 
i= 1 
j=1, ... ,N,I=1,2, 
N 
~ nD ~L-I L.- LJ = L.- ¡, 
j=O ¡ 
1 nterpretation 
t = 1,2. 
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A. = 1 + rj where r. is the interest rate charged for loans to firmj, and rc is the 
J l+r' J 
(market) i~terest rate faced by consumers. Thus A) acts as a dis~o.unt on .the price 
ofthe investment good (see F2b aboye), if the government subsldlzes an m~ustry, 
or a surcharge, ifit wishes to depress investment in an indu~try. The expresslon on 
the r.h.s. oC F3 is the total subsidy; F3 states that corporatton taxes exactly cover 
the total subsidy. 
Definition 4.2 . ' 
A pro-investment Lange equilibrium relative to the Investment vector T IS a Lange 
equilibrium in which, for j = 1, ... , N, A) ~ 1. . 
Define.s;{L to be the set of Lange equilibria relative to sorne mvestment vector, 
and .s;{LIO.IJ to be the set of pro-investment Lange equilibria. 
Theorem 4.1 13 
A. (Simple socialist case) Jf (Jij = (J¡)', for all i = 1, ... , M and for all j, 
i' = 1, ... ,N, then 
siL = slECW and slLIO.1 J = slCw • 
B. (General case).s;{L ~ .s;{ECW, .s;{LIO.IJ ~ .s;{cw, and the inclusions are strict. 
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We next introduce a second specialization of the definition of Lange 
equilibrium. 
Definition 4.3 
A limited-taxation Lange equilibrium relative to T = (TI' ... , TN ) is a Lange 
equilibrium such that: 
O ~ t j ~ 1, for allj = 1, ... ,N. 
Similarly, a limited-taxation pro-investment Lange equilibrium is a limited-
taxation equilibrium where for all j, A.j ~ l. 
Let d LTL be the set of allocations that arise as limited-taxation Lange 
equilibria, and dLTL[O,I) be the allocations that aríse as límited-taxation 
pro-investment Lange equilibria. Let d CW + be the set of constrained Walrasian 
allocations where total profits in the consumer-good industries are nonnegative. 
Theorem 4.2 (Simple socialist case) 
If 0ij = Oí)" for all i = 1, ... , M and for all j, j' = 1, ... , N, then 
dLTLIO.I) = d Cw +, 
d LTL = d ECW +. 
5* Direct provision of investment by the state 
Definition 5.1 
A direct investment (DI) equilibrium with corporate taxation relative to T consists 
of prices (pi, p2, wl , w2) an allocation (Xl, X2, yl, y2, [ID, [lD, M+ T), and tax 
rates t = (tl, ... ,tN)ER~ on profits such that: 
01 (Yo, [~D) solves firm O's profit-maximization program: 
maxp~y~ - wIL~D 
S.t. !o(L~)";:~. y~D; 
( -1 -2 L-ID L-2D ) - l (' . l Yj'Yj, j' j Mjsoves,lor]= , ... ,N, 
-1 1 -2 2 -IL ID -2 L 2D - M max Pj YJ + Pj YJ - W j - W J - Po J 
S.t. !/ (LJD) ~ yJ, 
!/(f¡ + Mj,L;D) ~ y;, 
MJ~O; 
02 (X¡I, x¡) sol ves consumer i's utility-maximization program: 
max u¡ (x: x: ) 
N 
t -1 1 -22 -IL-I -2r2 O "'0(1 ) S.. p-O· x¡ + P . x¡ ~ W ¡ + W L¡ + IOno + L... ¡j - t j nJ, 
J= 1 
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-1-1 -2-2 -IFID -2F2D -IM- (' . 1 Nand1t-where 1tj = p) y) + Pj y) - W L) - W Lj - Po j lor ] = , ... , 0-
-1-1 -1 [ID. PoYo - W o' 
N N 
03 L tj1t) = p~ L lj (the government's budget constraint); 
j= 1 )= 1 




Note that all firms make nonnegative profits at a DI equilibrium. 
As in section 4*, we define the following specialization of the aboye definition. 
, 
Definition 5.2 ~ 
A limited-taxation direct investment equilibrium relative to lis a direct investment 
equilibrium such that, ror all j = 1, ... , N, O ~ t j ~ l. 
Let d Dl be the set of direct investment allocations with corporate taxation 
relative to sorne 1. Let d LTDl be the set of limited taxation DI-equilibrium 
allocations with corporate taxes. 
Theorem 5.1 (Simple socialist case) 
If for all i = 1, ... , M and j, j' = 1, ... , N, (1) = O¡), then 
A. d CW = dDl. 
B. d Cw + = d LTDl . 
Theorem 5.2 
A. dLTL(o.l) e d LTDl . In general the inclusion is strict. 14 
B. The simple socialist case, if for all i = 1, ... , M and j, j' = 1, ... , N, Oí) = O¡), 
then dLTL(O,I) = d LTDl = d Cw +. 
6* The sales-tax model 
Assumption 6.1 
The receipts T from taxes are returned to the consumers according to a given 
transfer rule S: R -+ R M satisfying: 
M 
(a) for all TE R, L S¡(n = T; 
¡=I 
(b) ifT~O,thenS¡(T)~O,i= 1, ... ,M. 
Remark 6.1 
Assumption 6.1 is satisfied by the proportional transfer rule S¡(T) = (J¡T, for 
M 
«(J" ... , (JM) E R~ satisfying L (J¡ = 1. 
¡= 1 
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Remark 6.2 
We interpret both T and S¡ (T) as measured in nominal terms, Le., relative to an 
arbitrary unit of account. This allows the subsidy rule to be numéraire-
dependent, although the proportional subsidy rate is not. Alternatively, one may 
avoid this feature by interpreting that both T and S¡(T) are measured in real 
terms, Le., in the units of a good selected as numéraire. 
Remark 6.3 
Sales receipts T could in principie be negative, i.e., the consumer purchases of 
sorne goods are subsidized by taxes on other goods and lump-sum taxes on 
consumers. Theorem 6.1 below will actually show the existence of an equilibrium 
with nonnegative T. 
Assumption 6.2 
For j = 1, ... ,N, and ~ > O, limMRSj(e) = O .
.... 0 
Assumption 6.3 
For i = 1, ... , M, L¡l > O, and u¡ is strictly quasi-concave and strictly increasing. 
Dejinition 6.1 
Let T» O. A second-period production equilibrium relative to T is a vector 
(Wl,W2,¡;~,¡;2,[2D)ER+ x R+ x R+ X R~ x R~ sa-tisfying 
N 
(i) L ~ solves max¡;~y - w1(f¿)-1(y); 
j= 1 )1 
(ii) for j = 1, ... ,N, (~,LJD) solves max¡;Jf/(lj,Lj ) - ¡;~/j - w2 LJD; 
I¡.L¡ 
N M 
(iii) L LfD = L Lf. 
)= 1 ¡= 1 
Remark 6.4 
If (w 1, w2, ¡;~,¡;2, [2D) is a second-period production equilibrium, then so is 
(A.W 1, A.W2, A.¡;~, A.¡;2, [2D) for any A. > O. 
Lemma 6.1 
Under Assumption 6.2, if T» O and jtl ~ < f¿ (~I Lf), then a second-period 
production equilibrium relative to T exists (with w1 = 1). 
Proof (sketch) 
Define, for j = 1, ... , N, 
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and 
N 
p¡(L) = (l/N) L rJ>1(LI ) - rJ>¡(Lj ), j = 1, ... , N; 
¡:::1 
M 




tl Lj = L}, and the continuous mapping A:AL ..... AL , 
Lj + lmax{O,pj(L)} 
A¡(L) = N • 
1 + ¿ max{O,p¡{L)} 
;= I 
A fixed point of A yields the desired second-period allocation of labor, see 
Ortuño-Ortin, Roemer and Silvestre (1991) for details. 
Remark 6.5 
Assumption 6.2 is indispensable for the validity of Lemma 6.1, see Example 3 in 
Ortuño-Ortin, Roemer and Silvestre (1991). 
We view the government as choosing 2N tax rates (T~, ... ,T~,T~, ... ,T~), 
where r'. is the tax on good j at period t. Producer prices P-o = 
(p!, ... ,~~, p~, . .. ,p~) are then related to consumer prices t/I = 
(t/I!, ... , t/I~, t/I~, ... ,t/I~) by the sales-tax equalities: 
I/I~ = (1 + T~)p~, 
or: 
T' - I/I~ - P~ 
J - p~ , 
where T~ can in principIe range from -1 to + oo. . 
Consumer i takes as given his wealth W¡ and the consumer prtces t/I. He 
chooses x¡ = (x:'x~)ER!N in order to maximize u¡ on y(t/I, W¡) = 
{x¡ER!Nlt/I·x¡ ~ W¡}. This set is closed and convex, and it is nonempty for 
W¡ ~ O, but it fails to be compact when t/I~ = O for sorne t,j. Define: 
k = 2 JI [1/ C~I r:) + 1j2 (f¿ C~I r:)' ¡~I r~) 1 
K = {(XII ,x¡)ER~lx:¡ ~ k for j = 1, ... , N and t = 1,2}, 
and: 
y(I/I, W¡} = '((1/1, W¡) 11 K. 
Define the functions: 
~¡: R~+ x R + -+ R 2N : ~I (1/1, W¡) = "the unique maximizer of U¡ on {(I/I, W¡)," 
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and: 
~¡: R¡N x R + ..... R 2N : ~,(IjJ, W¡) = "the unique maximizer of U¡ on ~(IjJ, W¡}." 
These functions are well defined, because they involve maximizing a continu-
ous function on a compact set and because the uniqueness of the maximizer is 
guaranteed by strict quasi-concavity and strict monotonicity. 
W · - (-1 -1 -2 -2) d- (-1 -1 -2 -2) ntep_o= PP,,,,PN,PI,,,,,PN an Y-o= YI""'YN'YI""'YN' 
Definition 6.2 
A sales-tax equilibrium relative to a (strictly positive) vector of sectoral investments 
1 = (11" .. ,In) and to a transfer rule Sis a vector (pi, p2, Ifl, 1f2, wl, w2, Xl, x2, yl, 
ji2, LID, pD) = (p, If, w, X, ji, L)ER 2N + 1 X R2N X R2 X R 2MN X R 2N + 1 X 
R2N + 1 such that: 
(i) (Y~,L~D) maximizes p~y - w1L subject to Y =fol (L); 
(,',') t' • 1 N (/- L-ID L-2D ) l lor ] = , ... , , j' j 'j so ves: 
max P;.f/(LJD) - ¡vILJD + P;.f/{lJ,L;D) - w1L;D - p~lJ; 
(lJ,LJD,L;D) 
(iii) . -1 1 -ID -2 2 - -2D for] = 1, ... ,N'Yj =Jj (Lj )andYj =Jj (lj,Lj ); 
N 
(iv) -1 ~-Yo = L. I j ; 
j=1 
(v) If» O, and, for i = 1, ... , M, Xi = ei(lf, W¡}, wh~re 
Wi = ¡vI Lil + ¡v2 L¡ + OiO(P~y~ - ¡vI L~) 
N 
+ L 0ij(pJ yJ + p; y; - ¡vI L]D - ¡v2 L¡D - p~TJ) 
j=1 
N M 
(vi) L LJD = L Lil; 
j=O j= 1 
N M 
L L~D = L L¡; 
J= 1 i= 1 
M 
( ") ~ -1 -1 . 1 N t 1 2 VII L. Xij = Yj; ] = , ... , , = , . 
i= 1 
Remark 6.6 
Let S be proportional (see Remark 6.1 aboye), and assume that (p, If, w, X, ji, L) is 
an equilibrium relative to land that ).»0. Then (Xp,;.If,;,~v,x,ji,[) is an 
equilibrium for r Of course, the same tax rates t~ = (~- p~)/p~ apply to both 
equilibria. This is no longer true when S is numéraire-dependent, see Remark 6.2 
aboye. 
We now tackle the existence issue. Choose a positive second-period produc-
tion equilibrium (w l , w2, p~, p2, PD), which will be kept fixed in what follows 
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N 
(Lemma 6.1 guarantees that this is possible). Write y¿ = L ~ and 
J= 1 
L¿D = (j~) -1 (y¿). The choice of first-period magnitudes is basically unrestricted: 
let (L~D, ... ,L1D ) be any strictly positive vector satisfying 
N M L LJD = L L¡I - L~D. 
J= 1 i= 1 
For j=I, ... ,N, write Y]=f/(L}D) and choose p] so that y] solves: 
maxp]y- (j/)-I(y). This choice is again possible by concavity. For future 
y -ID L-ID - I -1) ji 'd d' reference, we call a vector (L I , ... , N' PI" .. ,PN a rst-perlO pro uctlon 
equilibrium (we take w1 to be one). These choices of first- and second-period 
production equilibria define a vector (p, w, y, L), to be called a production 
equilibrium (relative .,to n, which will be kept fixed in what follows. For 
i = 1, ... , M, define: ' 
and 
W¡{IjJ) = ¡vIL: + ¡v2L~ + O¡o(fJ~Y~ - ¡vI L~D) 
N 
+ L O¡J(pJyJ + p;y; - ¡vILJD - ¡v2L;D - p~TJ) 
J=I 
+ S/((1jJ - p-o)' Y-o), 
~N) = ~i(ljJ, W¡ (1jJ» E R2N, 
M 
{(IjJ) = L ~i(ljJ) - Y_ oER2N• 
i=l 
Lemma 6.2 (Walras' Law) 
Under Assumptions 6.1 and 6.3,for all IjJ = (ljJl,ljJ2)ER 1N, IjJ . {(IjJ) = O. 
Theorem 6.1 
Under Assumptions 6.1-6.3, an equilibrium relative to 1 (1)> O) and S exists. 
Proof (sketch) 
Take an arbitrary positive number (X satisfying: (X ~ p-o' Y-o, and define the 
simplex Aa = {IjJ E R~N I IjJ . ji _ O = (X}, which is homeomorphic to the standard 
2N - 1 dimensional simplex because ji~ > O (j = 1, ... , N, t = 1,2). Define the 
contin uous function: 'JI: Aa -+ Aa' 
1 1jJ~ + (cx/y~)max{O,{~(IjJ)} 
'PJ(IjJ) = N 2 • 
1 + L L max{O,{~(IjJ)} 
i= 1 v= 1 
A fixed point of'JI yields the desired consumer prices. See Ortuño-Ortin, Roemer 
and Silvestre (1991) for details. 
The proofofTheorem 6.1 shows that for a (w, p, y, ID) satisfying the conditions 
of a production equilibria in both periods one can obtain a (at least one-
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dimensional) continuum of equilibria by varying the parameter (X in the proof as 
long as (X ~ p _ o . ji - o' Our proof restricts (X to be not lower than p _ o . ji _ o' th us 
ensuring that tax receipts are nonnegative and, hence, that the wealth of 
consumers is positive. If(X < P-o' ji -o' then an equilibrium withji -o' '" = (X may 
or may not existo It will not exist if the data of the economy are such that the 
wealth of a consumer becomes negative for negative and large (in absolute value) 
tax receipts. 
Now we show that, given a direct investment equilibrium with aggregate level 
of investment K* (i.e., K* = :El¡ + :EM¡), there is a sales-tax equilibrium that 
yields the same aggregate investment K* yet (weakly) Pareto-dominates the 
original direct investment equilibrium. 
Theorem 6.2 
L t - (-1 1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2 rlD r2D T -e e = w, ,w ,p ,p ,x ,x ,y ,y ,L ,L , + M) be a direct investment 
equilibrium relative to T» O. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 6.1 are 
satisfied, and that 
N 
¿ (T) + M) <fOI(l}). 
)=1 
Then there exists a positive vector f, a proportional transfer rule S, S¡(T) = (J. T, 
i = 1, ... , M, and a sales-tax equilibrium ~ relative to f and S with associa~ed 
consumption allocation ~ such that: 
N N 
(i) ¿fJ=¿(1"¡+RJ); 
J= 1 j= 1 
(ii) u¡(~: ,#) ~ U¡(X¡1 ,X~). 
Notes 
1. For a good précis ofthe history ofthe concept, see W. Brus (1987). For discussions of 
the reforms in the Soviet Union, see Hewett (1988) and Aslund (1989). 
2. Negative externalities associated with pollution, for instance; positive externalities 
associated with "endogenous growth," as in Romer (1986). 
3. A~other possibility occurs to us to explain Lange's insistence that the state set prices 
of lnvestment goods. It would have been too radical, within the socialist community, 
to propose that the state set only the interest rates, and leave everything else to the 
market. Socialist parties, whom Lange presumably hoped to influence, would not 
have been content with so apparently minor an interventionist role. 
4. We assume throughout that the center knows all the parameters ofthe economy; we 
are not concerned here with the implementation problem which must take into 
account incentive compatibility. 
5. Although constrained Walrasian allocations are second-best Pareto-optimal as 
described, they are not generally technologically efficient. The given composition of 
output is efficiently distributed among citizens; labor is efficiently allocated among 
firms, given their levels of investment; but it is generally possible to find a reallocation 
I nvestment planning in market socialism 305 
ofinvestment among firms, and a reallocation oflabor that would increase production 
of all outputs. Such reallocation of investment are, however, precluded given the 
government's investment objective. 
6. In his speech after being sworn in to the Soviet presidency, as translated by Tass and 
reported in the New York Times of March 16, 1990. 
7. Note that these tax rates may be greater than one. 
8. Of course, Lange equilibria inherit the second-best Pareto-optimality of constrained 
Walrasian equilibria. Moreover, suppose the government wishes to implement only a 
given aggregate level of investment. It can accomplish this with just one interest rate 
discount for all firms. The resultingequilibrium will be technologically efficient, unlike 
constrained Walrasian equilibria. (It will still, however, be only second-best 
Pareto-optimal, as there will generally be reallocations of labor between the 
investment sector and the consumption sector that will produce a composition of 
output that can be distributed in a way to increase the utility of all citizens.) There is no 
natural way to implement a targetted aggregate level of investment in the command-
market model of section 3. To whom would the center issue the command? 
9. As we show in section 4*, the Lange model may also be interpreted atemporally, by 
using the device offutures' prices, in which case interest rates do not explicitly appear. 
In this version, it is as ifthe government refunds to the firm a portion of the cost of each 
unit of investment good the firm purchases. The price which the firm in sector j pays 
for the investment good is effectively discounted by the factor 1
1 
+ rJ , where r) and re 
+ re 
are the industry and market interest rates, respectively. 
10. See, however, the caveat in n. 14 to Theorem 5.2 in section 5*. 
11. We take a social democracy to be an economy with private ownership of firms in 
which the government is empowered to influence investment. 
12. We assume that firm O is not taxed. 
13. Proofs of all theorems are available in Ortuño-Ortin, Roemer and Silvestre (1991). 
14. We show strict inclusion by providing an example where N = 2. Our example is not 
entirely satisfactory. It does, indeed, show the existence of an allocation that is 
implementable by direct investment but not by interest rates; however, the investment 
vector of the allocation is implementable in a Lange allocation. We ha ve not found an 
example showing that the set of investment vectors implementable as Lange 
allocations is a proper sub-set ofthose implementable by direct investment. We have 
not searched in models with N > 2. 
